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Abstract  
In general, the literature on the Danish and Norwegian labor market systems emphasizes the 
commonalities of the two systems. In this paper, we challenge this perception by investigating 
the development of flexicurity in Denmark since the mid-1990s. We argue that flexicurity 
constitutes a significant regulatory development in that it grants Danish employers a 
considerably greater degree of flexibility to engage in staffing changes than its Nordic 
counterpart Norway which has not introduced it. Institutional theory leads us to suppose that 
firms located in the Danish setting will be less likely to engage in employer-employee 
communication on staffing plans.  In addition we argue that in the Danish context indigenous 
firms will have a better insight into the normative and cognitive aspects to flexicurity than 
foreign-owned firms meaning that they are more likely to engage in institutional 
entrepreneurialism than their foreign-owned counterparts. We supplement institutional theory 
with an actor perspective in order to take into account the role of labour unions. We generate 
5 hypotheses and test these using a survey of 203 companies. On the whole we observe for 
Denmark and Norway a parting of the ways particularly for indigenous Danish firms. 
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Introduction 
In advanced economies such as the Danish and Norwegian the regulatory environment 
is not only a significant determinant of management modes in firms but it is also generally 
relatively stable. Changes that occur tend to be “path dependent” (cf. Hollingsworth, 2006) 
meaning that that there is a substantial degree of continuity in organizational forms. This 
continuity is evident in cross-national studies of changes over time to work-life relations 
(Katz and Darbishire, 2000) and in HRM practices (Gooderham and Nordhaug, 2011). In 
regulatory terms certain countries are regarded as institutionally so similar that they are 
grouped together. In the case of Denmark and Norway it has been common to refer to them as 
belonging to a Nordic model characterized by a particularly consultative employer-employee 
relationship. This grouping together of Nordic countries has been underpinned by substantial 
empirical support. For example in their operationalization of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
thesis (Hall and Soskice, 2001) Hall and Gingerich (2004), employing data from the 
early1990s, found that Denmark and Norway had virtually identical levels of institutional 
coordination. Likewise, using comparative data collected in 1995 Gooderham, Nordhaug and 
Ringdal (1999) observed that firms in Denmark and Norway were similar in terms of having a 
distinctively “collaborative mode” of employer-employee communication.   
  However, in Denmark, a series of collective agreements during the mid-1990s has 
steadily brought into being a new and distinctive model of industrial relations that has not 
been copied by Norway or any of the other Nordic countries. This model, that has come to be 
labeled, “flexicurity”, has two main components. On the one hand the model is characterized 
by relatively liberal redundancy rules that give employers the right to hire and dismiss 
employees at short notice. On the other hand the unemployed are provided with 
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comparatively generous unemployment benefits and training provision. It is argued that this 
model comprises an important regulatory change for Denmark and as such constitutes a 
source of divergence between Denmark and the other Nordic countries (Madsen et al., 2011). 
A large-scale Nordic study concluded: 
“The main conclusion of this study is that Denmark has a special combination of 
institutions related to its labour market. And this flexicurity nexus leads to higher mobility 
rates on the labour market.” (TemaNord, 2010:13).      
Employing institutional theory we address the impact of this regulatory change in 
Denmark on direct and indirect employer-employee communication by employers to 
employees in regard to impending staffing plans. We distinguish direct and indirect 
communication because the Nordic model is not just characterized by powerful labour unions 
that ultimately are legally entitled to be consulted on changes that affect their members, but 
also by relatively informal employer-employee relations at the firm level characterized by 
regular, direct briefings on company strategy. At a broad level our approach is to compare 
Denmark with its Nordic counterpart Norway which has not undergone regulatory change. In 
line with institutional theory we assume that regulatory change impacts on which 
management practices are perceived as having legitimacy. However, within each of the two 
national settings we distinguish indigenous firms from the subsidiaries of multinational 
companies (MNCs). We do this in order to investigate which of these actors are adjusting 
most proactively to the new “rules of the (Danish) game” (North, 1990). Thus while we 
expect that regulatory change has resulted in firms located in Denmark diverging in their 
employee communication practices from their Norwegian counterparts, within Denmark we 
will argue that it is its indigenous firms that have a more developed “feel” for the legitimate 
possibilities that flexicurity has introduced. They will therefore respond more dynamically to 
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regulatory, institutional change than foreign entrants because who will exercise greater 
caution.    
In the next sections we introduce the context of our study. We start with a broad 
presentation of the institutional regimes of Denmark and Norway. Thereafter we present the 
development of flexicurity in Denmark arguing that its evolution constitutes a significant 
regulatory change. This is followed by a discussion of institutional theory which enables us to 
develop hypotheses regarding direct and indirect employer-employee communication in 
Denmark and Norway. After delineating our data set we test our hypotheses. In the final 
section we discuss the implications of our findings.   
 
The institutional regimes of Denmark and Norway  
 In an analysis of advanced economies Hall and Soskice (2001) distinguish between two 
generic institutional contexts, liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market 
economies (CMEs). Typical LME regimes are the Anglo-Saxon countries such as the USA 
and the UK, while the typical CME regimes are the northern European countries such as 
Germany, Norway and Denmark. In LMEs the interactions between firms and other actors 
such as labor unions and banks is organized on the basis of free markets. In contrast, in CMEs 
these interactions are to a significant extent detached from the market so that they take place 
between “stakeholders” and on a more strategic and long-term basis. In CMEs there is a 
collaborative interaction between the political system, employers and labor unions in regard to 
the regulation of the labor market. Thus a substantial part of the labor market in CMEs is 
regulated on the basis of collective agreements underpinned by employment law, or by 
employment law with the social partners as important and respected stakeholders. Typically 
for a CME like Denmark, the Danish labor market reforms of 1994 and 1996 that gave rise to 
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the Danish flexicurity model were a product of tripartite agreements amongst employer 
federations, labor unions and the state.   
 On the work-place level CME regimes are characterized by a significantly greater 
degree of consultation of labor unions or employee representatives on strategic decision 
making – for example in regard to outsourcing and redundancies – than is the case in LME 
regimes. In regard to HRM practices the LME-CME divide is associated with a number of 
differences. Characteristically LME firms are associated with significantly greater salary 
differential and a greater use of individualized salary negotiations. They also typically have 
greater latitude in regard to terminating employment contracts than CME firms.  
 Using extant data sets originating from the early part of the 1990s Hall and Gingerich 
(2004) developed an empirical measure of the LME-CME divide. Their index indicates that 
the USA is the “purest” LME regime and Germany its diametrical opposite. While the 
measures for both Norway and Denmark indicate that both countries clearly are CMEs, the 
index also shows that they are somewhat different to Germany. In other words Norway and 
Denmark have a somewhat ambiguous status as CME countries (Campbell et al., 2006). One 
particular difference is that the legislation governing the employer-labor union relationship of 
Norway and Denmark (and the other Nordic countries) is less formalized and less detailed 
than is the case for Germany.  Thus, Madsen, Due and Andersen (2011, 225) observe that for 
Denmark that although it is, 
“a typical coordinated market economy…Danish labour market regulation also 
encompasses clear liberal elements…with the greater part of its regulation taking 
place within the framework of collective bargaining and not via legislation.”  
This distinguishes Denmark from Germany where “(the) extensive social regulation…has 
always been regulated by law and not by collective bargaining” (Keller and Kirsch, 
6 
 
 
2011:197). In practice this means that in Norway and Denmark, rather than legally determined 
accords, agreements between employers and labor unions are reached through on-going 
discussion and consultation. Hence the relationship is more flexible than is the case for 
Germany. It is this distinction that has given rise to the notion of a distinctive Nordic model 
(Løken, 2009).  
 This distinction between the legalistic context of Germany and the more flexible 
Nordic context is reflected in Gooderham, Nordhaug and Ringdal’s (1999) analysis of 
differences in the deployment of HRM practices. On the one hand their study confirms the 
distinction between Germany and the Nordic countries and LME countries in regard to the use 
of “calculative” HRM practices: thus the former make far less use of individual performance–
related rewards than the latter. However, they also observed that as opposed to Germany, 
firms in the Nordic context made a marked use of local, firm-level consultative HRM 
practices characterized by considerable employer-employee communication. Thus they 
concluded that Germany and the Nordic countries constitute two distinct HRM regimes. 
As Wailes, Bamber og Lansbury (2011:24) argue: 
“While national employment relations patterns may not be converging towards a 
single neo-liberal model, there is overwhelming evidence that change is a common feature of 
employment relations in many countries.”   
One criticism of “varieties of capitalism” (VoC) is that explanations of change are 
problematic to develop within its framework. One reason VoC is overly deterministic is that it 
is lacking in an actor and therefore a conflict perspective. As Oliver (1991) argues firms can 
engage in active resistance to institutional constraints. Thus national settings are less 
homogenous than a VoC approach implies. Equally the activities of other actors such as trade 
unions can also have a significant impact on the development of management practices.  
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The Nordic countries are characterized by many commonalities.  In the specific case 
of Norway and Denmark it has been pointed out that both have knowledge-based, service-
economies (Rogaczewska et al., 2004). However, more fine-grained analyses have suggested 
that Denmark and Norway have become somewhat dissimilar. The Danish flexicurity 
agreements of the mid- and late 1990s mean that there are significant differences in the degree 
of employee protection against redundancy. Furthermore, there are indications that HRM in 
Denmark is less formalized, structured and top-down than in Norway (Rogaczewska et al., 
2004). Finally, it is suggested that the relationship between employers and labor unions in 
Denmark are becoming more fractious than in Norway (Amable, 2003).  
Traditionally a key component of the Nordic model is that of employer-employee 
communication which is a facet of employee voice (Knudsen, 1995; Thorsrud and Emery, 
1970). “Employee voice is any type of mechanism, structure or practice, which provides an 
employee with an opportunity to express an opinion or participate in decision-making within 
their organization” (Lavelle et al, 2010: 396). The foundations of communication or voice 
derive from legislation, agreements, and the way establishments organize work (Knudsen, 
1995). Communication can divided into indirect and direct communication. Whereas indirect 
communication takes place through unions or collective bargaining, direct communication 
involves no intermediary. In Norway, indirect communication is regulated in labour law and 
collective agreements. If a firm plans to make changes in staffing, for instance a downsizing, 
it is legally obliged to inform and discuss this with union representatives at an early stage 
(Work Environment Act (§15-2)).  In Denmark rather than strictly legal obligations, 
regulatory obligations have derived from Cooperation Agreements. With the introduction of 
flexicurity this regulatory pressure to engage with labour unions is arguably diluted.  
In Norway there is a lack of specific legislation in regard to employers supplying 
information directly to employees it has been commonplace. In other words in Norway well-
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established norms dictate this practice.  In Denmark direct communication has been governed 
by the Cooperation Agreements. However, this regulatory obligation is also diluted by the 
introduction of flexicurity which gives employers the right to introduce staffing changes at 
short notice. Instead, increasingly what will determine direct communication with employees 
on staffing plans are obligations of a more normative kind. With the introduction of 
flexicurity, an employer’s reading of what those normative obligations actually are may vary 
significantly. In the next section we discuss flexicurity in more detail. 
 
Flexicurity and differences between Norway and Denmark    
A core feature of the Danish flexicurity model is that it combines elements from welfare 
systems and labor market regulation (Anderson and Pontusson, 2007; Madsen, 2003). The 
aim of flexicurity is that it increases both labor market flexibility and the security of 
individual employees. The main elements of the model comprise a relatively weak protection 
against redundancy; generous unemployment benefits; and an active labor market policy that 
provides training if necessary (Madsen, 2003; TemaNord, 2010). Weak employment 
protection provides employers with flexibility to adjust their work-forces in relation to 
changes in demand. This form of flexibility is generally regarded as a source of numerical or 
external flexibility (e.g. Pfeffer and Baron, 1998). Madsen, Due and Andersen (2011, 224) 
acknowledge that this development has provided Danish employers with a degree of staffing 
flexibility “on par with that of the United Kingdom” so that in this regard Denmark is 
“different from that of the other Nordic countries” – i.e. on this particular issue Denmark has 
LME traits. The empirical question that arises from this observation is whether this change 
has had consequences for the employer-labor union relationship. In exploring these issues it 
is important to bear in mind that the flexicurity model has its origins in tripartite negotiations 
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and a series of tripartite agreements that accommodated both employers’ call for decentralized 
negotiations and employees and the labor unions demands for the maintenance of robust 
collective agreements as back-up if local negotiations fails. This is fundamentally dissimilar 
to the decentralization that emerged in the United Kingdom where employment flexibility was 
precipitated by the weakening of the bargaining power of labor unions and the collective 
bargaining system.   
 Staffing is one of the core responsibilities of HRM. The concern for greater 
precariousness for workers in the labour market reflects in part employers need for numerical 
flexibility through the use of non-standard work arrangements, such as subcontracting, 
outsourcing, and temporary work (e.g. Kalleberg, 2011). Our assumption is that two types of 
regulations are critical for the way in which managers consult unions on staffing issues. First, 
there are those regulations that impact on employers’ use of different staffing solutions, 
whereas a second type determines the degree to which employers have to engage in 
consultations with employees prior to work-force reduction and work reorganization. This 
consultation may take place through indirect (e.g. unions) or direct voice mechanisms.  
In regard to the first of these assumptions there is a marked difference between the 
Danish and the Norwegian regulatory frameworks. In a comparison of 40 OECD countries 
Denmark was ranked as one of twelve countries with the weakest employment protection 
legislation (EPL), while Norway was ranked as having the ninth strictest EPL (OECD, 2008; 
see also TemaNord, 2010). The EPL-index comprises a measure of the regulations governing 
the use of temporary employees and both individual and collective redundancies. Norway has 
stricter regulations than Denmark in regard to temporary employment and individual 
redundancy. Denmark has somewhat stricter regulations governing collective redundancies.  
Other regulations with relevance for staffing would include regulations in regard to 
outsourcing and the use of agency staff.  In Norway both of these as well as the use of 
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temporary staff is regulated by The Working Environment Act. In addition the processes 
involved in staffing changes are specified in the collective pay agreements. Although the 
concept of “outsourcing” is not specifically used in Norwegian employment law there are 
regulations governing the transfer of employees to suppliers. The main regulation specifies 
that employees will retain their rights and that their duties will be unchanged. The legislation 
does not extend to those rare cases whereby employees are relocated to an employer outside 
of Norway. These regulations constitute implementation of EU-directives into Norwegian 
law.. Employers are also subject to regulations that specify the provision of information and 
consultation in changing staffing levels and in changes to the organization of work. These 
regulations are not only entrenched in The Working Environment Act and collective pay 
agreements but they also have acquired the status of unquestioned cultural conventions.  The 
Working Environment Act specifies that not only must local labor union representatives be 
consulted but that this consultation must take place at the earliest possible point in time 
(indirect voice). Although in the final instance it is employers who make the decision and who 
have the responsibility for any redundancies (Jusstorget, 2011), local labor union 
representatives must be given the opportunity to express their opinion in regard to the basis 
for redundancies and, if they consider it acceptable, to then determine the criteria that will 
govern it.  
The main principle concerning employment relations is that employees should have an 
open-ended contract (“fast ansettelse”) in Norway. The use of temporary labour is an 
exception to the main principle and should only be used when “work tasks are of a temporary 
nature”. Over the last two decades, there have been several changes regarding the access to 
use temporary workers (in 1995 and 2000) and workers from Temporary Help Agencies 
(THA) (in 1993 and 2000) (“innleie av arbeidstakere”). These changes have implied both 
restrictions and liberalizations regarding the access to use temporary labour. However, the 
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main principle of open-ended employment still holds. The most important change with regard 
to voice mechanisms on staffing took place in 2010. In The Working Environment Act has 
since 2010 ruled that employers must discuss their use of temporary employees with local 
labor union representatives at least annually. This is change is an example of a strengthening 
of legislation on indirect voice. There have been no substantial changes in regulations on 
firing employees in Norway.  
In Denmark the Cooperation Agreement of 2006 (the first such agreement was entered 
in 1947) between the Trades Union Federation (LO) and the Employers Federation (DA) 
contains the most important stipulations on employer-labor union information and 
consultation. The agreement is broadly formulated and generally emphasizes the importance 
of engaging in a high degree of information provision and consultation. Employers are duty-
bound by the agreement to update the local Cooperation Committees on the financial position 
and prospects of the company and the firm’s staffing plans – and if there is no works 
Cooperation Committees they have to be informed individually and in groups. Employers also 
have to provide information on any “significant changes and developments with regard to any 
introduction of new technology in production and administration” as well on “the 
employment situation” (Cooperation Agreement 2006, 7-8). More specifically the agreement 
stipulates what the firm ought to do in the case of having to engage in redundancies 
particularly as a consequence of introducing new technology.  As is the case with Norway the 
concept of outsourcing is not directly addressed. In both countries the issue is addressed by an 
EU-directive (2001/23/EF 12.March 2001). The EU “Law on employees’ rights in the transfer 
of employees to a new employer” § 2 states:  
“Following a transfer, the transferee of the undertaking becomes an employee of the 
undertaking transferred by the transferor. In these circumstances, the rights and 
duties of the employment contracts of the employees from the transferred undertaking 
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will be recognized with regards to 1) collective agreements 2) wage and working 
conditions stipulated or approved by public authority and 3) individual agreements on 
wage and working conditions.” 
In other words, the new employer is legally obliged to continue all agreements, both 
collective and individual, that applied prior to the transfer of employment. In both Denmark 
and Norway larger MNCs are subject to the European Works Councils Directive. This gives 
representatives of workers from all European countries a line of communication to top 
management and guarantees that employees in different countries are all told the same thing 
at the same time about company policies and plans. European Works Councils also provide 
workers’ representatives in unions and national works councils the opportunity to consult with 
each other and to develop a common European response to employers’ transnational plans, 
which management must then consider before those plans are implemented. In the sample that 
is the empirical base for our study we observe that 32 and 38 percent of the Norwegian and 
the Danish firms have European Works Councils.    
 However, if we disregard the European Works Councils we may observe that while 
the regulatory frameworks governing the Danish and Norwegian labor markets are similar in 
their intentions, there is one significant difference. In Norway, the employers have less 
freedom in hiring- and firing than Denmark. Furthermore, the legislation regarding indirect 
communication or voice mechanisms is extensive in Norway, and the recent change in 
indirect voice mechanisms for temporary labour implies a stronger emphasis on legislative 
law. Overall, in Norway hiring-and firing, access to use temporary labour, requirements for 
outsourcing, and voice mechanisms for changes in work organization (for instance 
downsizing and these use of temporary labour) are all regulated in labour law (The Working 
Environment Act). In other words, the regulations on employers in Norway regarding 
employment issues are both stricter than in Denmark, and there appears to be a tendency for 
13 
 
 
stronger legislative regulations over cooperative agreements on staffing- and employment 
practices.   As such the institutional setting of Denmark in regard to the employment contract 
has become somewhat more malleable than that of Norway.  
  
Institutional Theory 
New institutional theory is established as a key approach in conducting cross-national 
analyses of labor market regimes. In particular in its emphasis on the significance of 
differences in formal regulatory arrangements for modes of management of firms it has 
generated insights into cross-national dissimilarities in regard to selection of human resource 
management (HRM) practices (Gooderham, Nordhaug and Ringdal, 1999; Gooderham, 
Nordhaug and Ringdal, 2006). Although there are differences in the way in which new 
institutional theory has been conceptualized (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 2001; 
Tolbert and Zucker, 1996), one commonality is that organizations are viewed as experiencing 
pressure to develop organizational forms and management practices that are considered 
legitimate by their external environments (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). If they fail to achieve 
legitimacy they expose themselves to the danger of being exposed to sanctions. Within 
specific organizational fields this pressure to achieve legitimacy leads to organizational 
isomorphism (Scott, 1995). Institutional theory distinguishes three distinctive but overlapping 
dimensions of external pressure: the cognitive, the normative and the regulatory.  
Institutional theory suggests that, in order to survive, organizations need to gain 
legitimacy in regard to all three dimensions and that as a result they will tend to conform both 
to the rules and the belief systems prevailing in their environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Thus institutional theory argues that firms are not just responding to legislation. They 
are also operating within an institutional framework of norms, values, and taken-for-granted 
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assumptions about what constitutes appropriate or acceptable economic behavior (Fenton-
O’Creevy and Wood, 2007; Oliver, 1997). Given the tacit nature of these “rule of the game” 
(North, 1990), it is reasonable to suppose that indigenous firms will have a better 
understanding of them than incoming, foreign-owned firms. In seeking legitimacy in highly 
regulated institutional environments foreign entrants will not only seek to conform, but their 
lack of understanding of the tacit aspects of these environments may cause them to over-
conform. Furthermore, in the case of regulatory change foreign entrants may be more cautious 
in their interpretation of its tacit implications than their indigenous counterparts meaning that 
they are more conservative in regard to introducing new management practices. In other 
words when regulatory change is introduced institutional theory suggests that “institutional 
entrepreneurship” (Battilina, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009) is more likely to be a feature of 
indigenous firms than foreign entrants.   
This distinction between indigenous and foreign-owned firms is a reminder that 
theories such as institutional theory that emphasize structure need to be supplemented with an 
agency perspective. Agency theorists view structuralist accounts of organizational behavior as 
overly deterministic. Oliver (1991) argues that organizations may have significant latitude to 
deviate from exogenous pressures and Battilana et al (2009:67) argue that actors may have 
varying degrees of agency. It seems reasonable to suppose that degrees of available agency 
will not just be limited to actor understandings of the tacit implications of regulatory change 
but will also reflect the degree to which other significant agents such as labour unions are 
proximate.  In the case of employer-employee communication we should distinguish indirect 
communication where labor unions exert a nationally distinctive common influence, from 
direct communication from which they are absent and where employers are therefore less 
constrained. It is in the latter context that we expect indigenous Danish firms to engage in 
institutional entrepreneurialism to a greater degree than their foreign-owned equivalents.   
15 
 
 
On the basis of the above discussion we can identify the following hypotheses. In 
regard to indirect employer-employee communication we hypothesize: 
 
Indirect communication 
H1 Firms based in Norway engage in a greater degree of employer-employee indirect 
communication than firms based in Denmark.  
 
H2 Within Norway and Denmark respectively there is no difference in the degree to which 
indigenous and foreign-owned firms engage in employer-employee indirect communication.  
 
Direct communication 
 
H3 Firms based in Norway engage in a greater degree of employer-employee direct 
communication than firms based in Denmark.  
 
H4 Within Norway there is no difference in the degree to which indigenous and foreign-
owned firms engage in employer-employee direct communication.   
 
H5 Within Denmark indigenous firms engage in less employer-employee direct 
communication than foreign-owned firms.  
 
  
 Data    
  Our sample comprises firms located either in Denmark or Norway which are either the 
parents of MNCs or the subsidiaries of MNCs.  In sampling we chose to focus on the 
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population of indigenous firms which have at least 500 employees world-wide, of whom at 
least 100 are based abroad, and the population of foreign-owned firms which have at least 100 
employees and whose parent company employ at least 500 employees world-wide, conducted 
in 2009-2010. Response rates for firms in Norway were 42 percent among indigenous firms 
(N=36) and 21 percent among foreign-owned firms (N=47). For Denmark the corresponding 
percentages were 27 (N=31) and 29 (N=89).  Analysis of missing firms indicated that the 
Norwegian sub-samples were representative in regard to the overall industry distribution of 
the sub-populations (Steen, 2010). A similar analysis could not be conducted for the Danish 
sub-samples. Given that our total sample comprises only 203 firms – and that there were 
missing responses on each of the items in our analysis - this imposes a limit on the number of 
variables we can introduce in our analysis. Our analysis focuses on the largest occupational 
group in each firm.   
 
Dependent variables  
We measure employer-employee indirect communication on staffing plans based on 
the question: “Which of the following types of information is regularly provided to the largest 
occupational group (LOG) within the company in Denmark/Norway”. The two alternatives 
relating to staffing are: (1) organization of work and (2) sub-contractors and outsourcing. The 
answers range from 5=management cooperate with unions, 3=management consult union 
representatives, and 1=management decides solely.  The two dimensions (1) and (2) are 
combined into an index (1-5). Cronbach’s alpha is 0.675.  The higher values on this index, the 
more cooperate strategies.  
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We measure employer-employee direct communication on staffing plans using a 
single item: Whether information on staffing plans is provided regularly to the largest 
occupational group (LOG) within the company in Denmark/Norway. (yes=1, no=0).   
Independent variables 
Our main explanatory variables are country and ownership. We distinguish between 
four groups of companies: 
Indigenous companies in Denmark (reference) 
Indigenous companies in Norway  
Foreign-owned companies in Denmark 
Foreign-owned companies in Norway 
In addition we include the following control variables
i
:  
Size: 100-500 employees (reference), 500 - 999 employees, and more than 1000 
employees 
Industry: manufacturing and service (reference) 
HR body/committee: Is there a body within the worldwide company, such as a 
committee of senior managers, that develops HR policies that apply across countries=1, 
else=0? 
Union recognition: Thinking of the LOG in the company in Denmark/Norway, are 
trade unions recognized for the purposes of collective employee representation at: all/most 
sites=1, or no/some sites =0 (reference)?  Based on this measure, union recognition on 
all/most sites is 71.6 %.  
Table A-1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables. 
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Findings 
 
Based on the institutional differences between Denmark and Norway we have 
hypothesized that while we expect to observe a between-country difference in employer-
employee indirect communication on staffing plans, we do not expect to observe any within-
country differences. The upper section of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on indirect 
communication on staffing plans for indigenous and foreign-owned companies in Norway and 
Denmark respectively. Indirect communication comprises measures of management strategies 
towards unions with regard to two staffing issues: the organization of work, and 
subcontracting/outsourcing. The higher the score, the greater is the degree of employer-
employee communication. The table indicates that companies in Norway, both indigenous and 
foreign-owned, engage in a higher degree of indirect communication than companies in 
Denmark. This applies to both measures of indirect communication. The table indicates that 
we combine these two measures in an index that ranges from 1-5. This index is the basis of 
analysis in Table 2. 
The lower section of Table 1 shows to what extent management provide employees 
with direct information on staffing plans. The table indicates that 57 percent of indigenous 
companies, and 61 percent of foreign-owned companies in Norway provide such information 
regularly. In Denmark, the proportions are 37 and 55 percent, respectively. In other words, 
indigenous companies in Denmark stand out as engaging in the least degree of direct 
communication on staffing plans.   
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Table 2 presents a linear regression analysis of indirect communication on staffing 
plans. The model controls for country combined with ownership, size and industry, HR policy 
and union recognition.   
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 2 indicates that there are significant between-country differences in indirect 
communication on staffing plans. The positive coefficients of indigenous companies in 
Norway (b=0,681) and of foreign based companies in Norway (b=0,900) imply that 
management in these establishments in Norway tend to engage in indirect communication 
consult unions with regard to staffing to a greater extent than establishments in Denmark. 
Thus H1 is supported. Furthermore, in line with H2, the table indicates that within each 
country there are no significant differences in indirect communication. We may further note 
that none of the control variables have any significant impact on indirect communication.  
 
| TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 3 presents the results from a logistic regression analysis on direct 
communication. It includes controls for country and ownership, size, industry, HR policy, and 
union recognition. Table 3 provides support for H4 in that there is no difference in the degree 
to which indigenous and foreign-owned firms in Norway engage in employer-employee direct 
communication.  It also provides support for H5 in that within Denmark indigenous firms 
engage in significantly less employer-employee direct communication than foreign-owned 
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firms. However, H3 is only partly supported in that it is only Danish indigenous firms that are 
significantly less inclined to engage in direct communication on staffing plans than 
Norwegian firms.  
 
Discussion  
This paper has explored direct and indirect employer-employee communication in the specific 
institutional contexts of Denmark and Norway. It is argued that the regulatory developments 
that constitute flexicurity give Danish employers a significantly greater degree of flexibility to 
engage in staffing changes than its Nordic counterpart Norway. It is further argued that this 
latitude to engage in numerical flexibility has implications for the degree to which Danish 
employers communicate with employees in regard to staffing plans. Institutional theory leads 
us to suppose that firms located in the Danish setting will be less likely to engage in this 
communication.  However, institutional theory is not limited to regulatory pressures. It is also 
includes both normative and cognitive pressures. In short, understandings of regulatory 
changes have to be developed. We have argued that indigenous firms have a superior insight 
into how changes to the “rules of the game” can be translated into new management practices. 
Thus we have proposed that indigenous firms in Denmark are more likely to engage in 
institutional entrepreneurialism than their foreign-owned counterparts. One limitation to 
institutional theory is that it lacks an actor perspective. As well as distinguishing between 
indigenous and foreign-owned firms, we have pointed to the role of labour unions as powerful 
actors in regard to indirect communication. Their influence is constant across ownership 
categories.  
On the whole our thesis that flexicurity constitutes a regulatory development that has 
consequences for employer-employee communication is supported. In terms of indirect 
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communication, in line with institutional theory, we observe that Norwegian firms are more 
likely to engage in indirect communication. In line with our actor perspective that emphasizes 
the common influence of labour unions across ownership categories we observe no 
differences between indigenous and foreign-owned firms. In terms of direct communication 
we have argued that the regulatory changes represented by flexicurity have provided Danish 
firms with common regulatory latitude to engage in new management practices. We have 
further argued that indigenous firms will be more adept at sensing the normative and 
cognitive latitude that is occasioned by this regulatory change. Thus we observe that Danish 
indigenous firms are significantly less inclined to engage in direct communication than 
foreign-owned firms. However, our reasoning underpinning hypothesis H3 underestimated the 
degree of conservatism among foreign-owned firms in Denmark. These firms engage in direct 
communication at the same level as firms located in Norway.   
In general our findings support the notion that flexicurity is causing some degree of a 
parting of the ways between Denmark and Norway. This is not least the case for Norwegian 
and Danish indigenous firms which are significantly different both in regard to indirect and 
direct communication.  Our findings have some limitations. Although we regard employer-
employee communication on the issue of staffing plans as a critical indicator of the Nordic 
model, arguably future research should examine other aspects of collaborativeness such as 
feedback from employees on their work environment. Our analysis should also be extended to 
the other Nordic countries. Finally, in terms of indigenous firms we have only included large 
enterprises that are particularly exposed to institutional pressures. Future research should 
include smaller firms.  
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Table 1. Indirect and direct communication on staffing. Descriptive statistics 
  Norway Denmark 
 
Home 
 
Foreign Home Foreign 
         
Indirect information Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean 
 Level of communication 
on..   
        ..organization of work 3.0 1.1 2.9 1.0 2.5 1.3 2.3 1.2 
..subcontracting and 
outcourcing 
2.3 1.2 2.7 1.2 1.6 0.9 1.8 1.1 
Index (1-5) 2.6 1.0 2.8 1.0 2.0 0.9 2.0 1.0 
Direct information         
Information on staffing 
plans (0-1) 
0.57 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.37 0.49 0.55 0.50 
N 26   39   24   63   
 
  Note: Indirect participation: Which of the following best describes the policy towards 
working with unions: managements decides on its own (=1), management consults union 
representatives (=3), and management decides jointly with union representatives (=5) on: (1) 
work organization, (2) sub-contracting and outsourcing. Direct participation: Whether 
information on staffing plans is provided regularly to the LOG (largest occupational group) in 
Norway/Denmark 
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b se
DK Foreign (ref: DK Home) 0.223 0.258
NO Home 0.681 * 0.284
NO Foreign 0.900 ** 0.268
Manufacturing (ref: service) -0.060 0.167
500 - 999 employees (ref: < 500) 0.214 0.224
> 1000 employees 0.256 0.198
Body/committee for HR policy (no 
committee)
0.028 0.176
Union recognition (no/some sites) 0.166 0.246
(Constant) 1.606 ** 0.353
Adj R2 0.098
N 133
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p<0.1
Note: 
Table 2. Indirect employer-employee communication 
on staffing. OLS. Reference category in parenthesis
Dependent variable: Index of organization of work and 
subcontracting/outsourcing (see Table 1)
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b se
DK Foreign (ref: DK Home) 0.947 + 0.501
NO Home 1.032 + 0.568
NO Foreign 1.143 * 0.532
Manufacturing (ref: service) 0.562 + 0.329
500 - 999 employees (ref: < 500) -0.575 0.425
> 1000 employees -0.500 0.409
Body/committee for HR policy (no 
committee)
-0.035 0.359
Union recognition (no/some sites) -0.218 0.383
Constant -0.541 0.597
R2 0.07
N 171
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p<0.1
Table 3. Direct employer-employee communication on 
staffing plans. Logistic regression. Reference category in 
parenthesis
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End notes: 
 
                                                          
i
 We also have checked for effects of the extent to which management are in favour, not in favour (very few), 
or neutral towards unions. In addition we have checked for the presence of European Work Councils. Neither 
of these variables had any significant effects.   
Table A-1. Descriptive statistics. All variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Mean sd
1. DK Home 0.15 0.36
2. DK Foreign (ref: DK 
Home)
0.44 0.50 -.375
**
3. NO Home 0.18 0.38 -.197** -.410**
4. NO Foreign 0.23 0.42 -.233** -.485** -.255**
5. Manufacturing (ref: 
service)
0.52 0.50 .072 -.099 .038 .019
6. 500 - 999 employees 
(ref: < 500)
0.21 0.41 .084 -.101 .014 .033 .076
7. > 1000 employees 0.28 0.45 .161* -.287** .198** .021 -.020 -.326**
8. Body/committee for HR 
policy (no 
body/committee)
0.67 0.47 -.062 .062 -.153
* .119 .015 .097 -.002
9. Union recognition 
(no/some sites)
0.72 0.45 .056 -.106 .002 .075 .134 -.040 .212
**
-.216
**
N 203
